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I.  Introduction 
How much do you trust your fellow drivers? Perhaps you have seen 
one drift over a lane line or suddenly swerve while accidentally dropping a 
drive-through meal in a lap, having a vehement discussion on a cell phone, 
shaving, putting on make-up, or reading a map. How much, for that matter, 
can you trust your own driving? Have you experienced any of these 
distractions or driven when exhausted after a long workday or in terrible 
traffic? Moreover, careless inattention might be the least of your worries. 
Road rage has become so common and so deadly that it has captured the 
attention of the United States Department of Transportation.
1
 Do we feel 
comfortable empowering these strangers—distracted, frazzled, and angry—
with calling the police and making anonymous accusations that could result 
in our suddenly being subjected to a traffic stop?  
Whatever doubts you might entertain about deputizing all the drivers 
around you, the Court, in Navarette v. California,
2
 has placed these 
motorists, with all of their faults and whims, on the front line of traffic 
enforcement. If a driver calls police to claim eyewitness knowledge of a 
single instance of “possibly careless or reckless driving”
3
 by a specific car 
in a particular location,
4
 police are now empowered to pull you over. No 
further information is needed, not even the name of the caller.
5
 Some 
motorists, whether to pursue revenge, fight boredom, or carry out a prank, 
might find this newfound power—provided without accountability—too 
hard to resist.  
This is just one of the concerns created by the Court’s reasoning in 
Navarette, a case in which the Court reinterpreted the Fourth 
                                                                                                     
 1. See JACK STUSTER, AGGRESSIVE DRIVING ENFORCEMENT: EVALUATION OF TWO 
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS (2004), http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/ 
research/AggDrivingEnf/pages/introduction.html (reporting the increase of aggressive driving 
cases since the 1990s and the contributing factors to such behavior). 
 2. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). 
 3. Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 4. Id. at 1689. 
 5. Id. at 1688–89. 
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 277 
Amendment’s
6
 requirement that police possess “reasonable suspicion” 
before performing a traffic stop.
7
 In basing the lawfulness of its stop on an 
anonymous tip, Navarette eroded reasonable suspicion, relying on little 
more than bootstrapping from an informant’s own assertions. Such 
credulous acceptance of anonymous accusations should now prompt a 
reassessment of the facts in an earlier anonymous informant case, Florida v. 
J.L.,
8
 for Navarette’s new approach could have resulted in finding 
reasonable suspicion even with J.L.’s troubling circumstances. Finally, 
Navarette’s diluted reasonable suspicion standard could encourage passive 
and sloppy policing, for officers will be tempted to rely on easily acquired 
anonymous tips rather than engage in arduous collection of evidence. 
These concerns will be addressed in this Article. This work begins, in 
Part II, with a review of the history of stop and frisk rulings based on 
informant’s tips. Part III presents Navarette by examining its facts and the 
Court’s opinion. Finally, Part IV critically examines the worrying 
implications of Navarette’s reasoning.  
II.  The History of Stop and Frisk Based On Informant Tips 
A.  Creation of the Police Power to Stop and Frisk 
The changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine that supported field 
detentions first occurred in a home rather than on the street and involved a 
search instead of a seizure.  This shift occurred in Camara v. Municipal 
Court, a case in which a homeowner was convicted for refusing warrantless 
entry to a city health inspector.
9
 Rejecting the argument that such routine 
inspections implicated only “peripheral” Fourth Amendment interests,
10
 
Camara found instead that the “practical effect of this system is to leave the 
                                                                                                     
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Id. 
 7. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
 8. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 9. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967). 
 10. See id. at 530. 
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occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”
11
 The Court 




Having marched up the hill to establish a warrant requirement for 
health inspections, the Camara Court spent the rest of its opinion making 
tactical retreats in the face of the practical problems involved in applying a 
warrant mandate to routine inspections.
13
 Camara acknowledged that health 
inspections were fundamentally different from “typical Fourth Amendment 
cases”
14
 because the “only effective way to seek universal compliance” 
with city codes was through “routine periodic inspections of all structures,” 
regardless of individualized suspicion in any particular dwelling.
15
 The 
Court therefore cast about for an “accommodation between public need and 
individual rights.”
16
 Instead of adhering to the traditional standard that an 
inspector must possess probable cause “that a particular dwelling contains 
violations,”
17
 Camara recast probable cause as an inquiry into 
reasonableness. For these new warrants, the Court transformed probable 
cause into the following balancing test: “In determining whether a 
particular inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether there 
is probable cause to issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the 




Thus, Camara found that a routine health inspection of a home 
implicated interests so central to Fourth Amendment privacy that such a 
search needed to be restrained by a warrant.
19
 The warrant providing the 
protection, however, was a pale reflection of the warrant mandated in 
                                                                                                     
 11. Id. at 532. 
 12. See id. at 534. 
 13. Camara was alert to the problems it faced in imposing the warrant requirement on 
health inspectors, for it warned that “translation of the abstract prohibition against 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines for the decision of particular 
cases is a difficult task.” Id. at 528. 
 14. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). The Court noted the 
“unique character of these inspection programs.” Id. 
 15. Id. at 535–36. Camara further explained that the aim of code inspections was to 
secure “city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards” in order to “prevent even 
the unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and 
safety.” Id. at 535. 
 16. Id. at 534. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 535. 
 19. Id. at 540. 
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criminal investigations, for its probable cause had been diluted to a vague 
balancing of interests. The Court’s new kind of probable cause had little 
textual basis, for the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for 
particularly described places, persons, or things.
20
 Camara sensed the 
weakness of its new probable cause standard, offering the excuse that, 
“Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the 
search entails.”
21
 Further, the Court explicitly recognized the criticism that 




This worry came to partial fruition in Terry v. Ohio,
23
 where a police 
officer with 39 years’ experience stopped and frisked men he suspected of 
“casing a job, a stick up.”
24





 a suspect on less than probable cause.
27
 Even when 
dispensing with probable cause, Terry still mandated that police act on 
individualized suspicion; to stop and frisk, the officer needed “specific and 
                                                                                                     
 20. U.S. CONST, amend. IV (“[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967). 
 22. Id. at 538. 
 23. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that a pat down search by a 
police officer is reasonable where the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person 
stopped is armed and dangerous, regardless of whether the officer has probable cause to 
arrest that individual). In assessing the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct in its own 
case, Terry cited Camara in noting “there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search 
[or seizure] entails.’” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21For a full analysis of Terry’s expansion upon 
Camara, see Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief 
of Camara and Terry 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 396 (1988), in which the author contended, 
“Because the (Terry) Court had not previously relied upon reasonableness as an independent 
fourth amendment factor, it did not have a reasonableness test to utilize. As a result, the 
Court turned to its closest example of a reasonableness balancing test -- the Camara 
definition of probable cause.”  
 24. Id. at 5. 
 25. See id. at 21–23 (stating that an intrusion upon the constitutionally protected 
interests of a citizen is justified if specific facts and inferences from those facts reasonably 
warrant that intrusion). 
 26. Id. at 30.  
 27. The Terry Court criticized the contention that police could not act until “there is 
probable cause to make an arrest,” because “a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger 
may arise long before the officer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a 
person into custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.” Id. at 25–27. 
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articulable facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts,”
28
 
caused the officer to “reasonably conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity is afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may 
be armed and presently dangerous.”
29
  
This level of certainty, later termed “reasonable suspicion,”
30
 lacked 
any textual basis in the Fourth Amendment, in which the founders mention 
only “probable cause.”
31
 Indeed, the Court itself had previously ruled that 
probable cause was the “best compromise that has been found to 
accommodat(e) . . . often opposing interests,”
32
 and lauded this Fourth 
Amendment standard for protecting “both the officer and the citizen.”
33
 In 
his dissent, Justice Douglas noted that the Court, in creating the right of 
stop and frisk on less than probable cause, had provided police with powers 
denied to judges. He reasoned:  
Had a warrant been sought, a magistrate would . . . have been 
unauthorized to issue one, he can act only if there is a showing of 
“probable cause.” We hold today that the police have greater authority 
to make a “seizure” and conduct a “search” than a judge has to authorize 
such action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again.
34
 
Defending its innovation, Terry cited Camara’s lament that there was “no 
ready test for determining reasonableness” other than in balancing the 
competing interests of a case.
35
  
Alert to the door it was opening to more searches and seizures, Terry 
took great care in reaching its conclusion. The Court candidly 
acknowledged that the case presented “serious questions”
36
 which thrust “to 
the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police 
activity.”
37
 The concerns of officers patrolling streets, where “the answer to 
the police officer may be a bullet,” had to be weighed against those of the 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 21. 
 29. Id. at 30. 
 30. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 32. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91(1964) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 176 (1949)). 
 33. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). 
 34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. at 21. Terry again sought support from Camara in applying the Fourth 
Amendment to official action falling outside the typical norm of custodial arrest. See id. at 
27. 
 36. Id. at 4. 
 37. Id. at 9. 
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individual, whose right to possess and control “his own person” was 
“sacred” and “carefully guarded by the common law.”
38
 The Court 
considered the case with humility, “mindful of the limitations of the judicial 
function in controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and 
citizens confront each other on the street.”
39
 Terry was aware of the 
institutional constraints on its ability to affect police in the field, even 
conceding it was “powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights” if officers were “willing to forgo successful prosecution 
in the interest of serving some other goal.”
40
  
However daunting it might be to limit a rule lacking textual anchors, 
Terry attempted to place a series of constraints on police stop and frisks. 
The Court approved only “restrained investigative conduct” that was based 
on “ample factual justification.”
41
 Terry insisted on assessing police 
reasonableness at two stages to ensure that (1) “the officer’s action was 
justified at its inception,” and (2) that “it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
42
 To 
justify the seizure in the first place, Terry mandated that an officer “point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
43
 The Court rejected 
police reliance on hunches or good faith, finding it “imperative” that 
official conduct be measured by “an objective standard.”
44
 While Terry 
allowed police to perform the stop and frisk without prior judicial approval, 
it expected the official intrusion to be subjected to rigorous examination by 
a judicial official after the fact, for, “[t]he scheme of the Fourth 
Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point 
the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to 
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 




                                                                                                     
 38. Id. (noting “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law.”).  
 39. Id. at 12. 
 40. Id. at 14. 
 41. Id. at 15. 
 42. Id. at 19–20.  
 43. Id. at 21. 
 44. Id. at 21–22. 
 45. Id. at 21. Moreover, the Court still expected police to pursue a warrant “whenever 
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The additional intrusion involved in a frisk required reasonable 
suspicion not just of criminality, but of peril—the suspicion had to point to 
the suspect being “armed and presently dangerous.”
46
 Even this suspicion 
only enabled a “carefully limited search” of “outer clothing” for “weapons 
which might be used to assault” the officer.
47
 Thus, reaching into pockets or 
under waistbands and seeking drugs or other evidence of criminality were 
beyond the scope of Terry’s reach.  
B.  Stop and Frisk Cases Involving Police Informants 
In Terry, Detective McFadden, the officer who performed the first stop 
and frisk officially sanctioned by the Court, based his reasonable suspicion 
entirely on his own observations.
48
 Some later stop and frisk cases would 
lack this luxury. In Adams v. Williams, an officer performed a stop and frisk 
based on a tip given by an informant who visited his patrol car in a high 
crime area at 2:15 a.m.
49
 Acting on the tipster’s information that “an 
individual seated in a nearby vehicle” possessed narcotics and a gun, the 
officer approached the car and ultimately reached through the driver’s 
window to recover the weapon from the occupant’s waistband.
50
  
The Court in Adams rejected the argument that reasonable suspicion 
could only be based on an officer’s personal observations, instead allowing 
officers to base a stop and frisk on any tip possessing “enough indicia of 
reliability.”
51
 The tip in Adams had indicators that proved its reliability.
52
 
The officer personally knew the informant, having received information 
from him in the past. 
53
 The informant potentially exposed himself to 
immediate arrest for making a false complaint, for the officer could quickly 
test the truth of his assertions by walking over to the nearby car.
54
 The 
                                                                                                     
practicable.” Id. at 20. 
 46. Id. at 30. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 5–7. 
 49. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1972). 
 50. Id. Sergeant Connolly, the officer in Adams, first merely walked up to the vehicle, 
tapped on the car window, and requested the occupant to open the door. Id. at 145. Only 
when the driver instead rolled down the window did the officer reach in to collect the gun. 
Id. 
 51. Id. at 147. 
 52. Id. at 146–47. 
 53. Id. at 146. 
 54. Id. at 146–47. 
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Adams Court even noted that the personal presence of a known informant 




Anonymous telephone tips went from hypothetical to reality in 
Alabama v. White,
56
 in which an unknown person provided a detailed tip 
that a Vanessa White could be found in possession of cocaine while driving 
a station wagon to a motel.
57
 White considered anonymous tips in light of 
Illinois v. Gates’ fundamental changes to probable cause analysis.
58
 In 
Gates, a case also involving an anonymous tip, the Court criticized an 
earlier test
59




 that it 
would better fit “legal technicians”
62
 or scholars in libraries
63
 than 
laypersons hurrying to fill out warrant affidavits.
64
 Gates instead 
championed a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach,” which had the 




While Gates still considered the two elements of the old test—the 
informant’s veracity and the informant’s basis of knowledge—such factors 
no longer had to be rigidly established separately and independently from 
each other.
66
 Under Gates’ new test, when assessing all the facts—the 
“totality of the circumstances”—for probable cause, a deficiency in one of 
the two prongs “may be compensated for, in determining the overall 
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some of the 
indicia of reliability.”
67
 Thus, if a person has established an unusually 
consistent track record in predicting certain kinds of criminal activities in a 
                                                                                                     
 55. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). 
 56. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 327.  
 58. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 
 59. Id. at 229. The earlier “two-pronged” test was formed in light of Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 231. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 232. 
 64. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). 
 65. Id. at 230–31 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). The 
Gates Court believed its new test considered human behavior in a common-sense fashion. 
Id. at 231 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
 66. Id. at 230. 
 67. Id. at 233 (referencing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146–47 (1972) and 
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) as exemplary cases). 
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location, this veracity and reliability can compensate for a tipster’s failure 
to explain his basis of knowledge. Likewise, if an informant provides a 
strong foundation for his basis of knowledge (i.e., “I saw the crime,” or “I 
participated in the sale”), then this inside information can compensate for a 
failure to otherwise establish truthfulness and reliability.  
The White Court applied a modified version of the Gates standard to 
decide whether its anonymous telephone tip “exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.”
68
 
While White employed a “totality of the circumstances” analysis,
69
 it 
applied this test to the  “reasonable suspicion standard” instead of probable 
cause.
70
 The “less demanding standard” of reasonable suspicion could be 
met not only with “information that is different in quantity or content” than 
that needed for probable cause, but also with information that is “less 
reliable than that required to show probable cause.”
71
  
White then focused on the anonymous informant in its case, noting that 
such a person’s tip, “alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of 
knowledge or veracity.”
72
 An anonymous tip, however, could be bolstered 
by other information.
73
 In its own facts, White found that “there is more 
than the tip itself” to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
74
 The 
informant provided a series of details that, while not as extensive as the 
informant in Gates, did establish a series of facts for police follow up.
75
 
White’s anonymous caller provided a time for White’s departure, specified 
the building from which she would leave, identified the color, make, model, 
and condition (“broken right taillight”) of the vehicle she would drive and 
the direction in which she would drive it.
76
 While not verifying every detail, 
                                                                                                     
 68. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326 (1990). 
 69. Id. at 332. 
 70. Id. at 328–29. 
 71. Id. at 330. 
 72. See id. at 329 (following the opinion in Gates, which noted, “the veracity of 
persons supplying anonymous tips is ‘by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable." 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 237. White followed Gates due to the factual similarity of the anonymous 
tips in both cases). 
 73. See id. (refusing to say that an anonymous tip “could never provide reasonable 
suspicion”). 
 74. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 327. 
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police “significantly” corroborated many of them.
77
 The officers in White 
thus bolstered the reliability of the tip through “independent police work.”
78
   
The White Court was particularly impressed with the tipster’s ability to 
predict the suspect’s future conduct.
79
 The Court declared, “We think it also 
important that, as in Gates, ‘the anonymous [tip] contained a range of 
details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at 
the time of the tip, but to future action of third parties ordinarily not easily 
predicted.’”
80
 The ability to foretell future behavior was especially 
important because “it demonstrated inside information—a special 
familiarity with [White’s] affairs.”
81
 Specifically, “[t]he general public 
would have had no way of knowing” that White would leave a particular 
building at a certain time, get into a particular vehicle, and drive in a 
particular direction.
82
 Because “only a small number of people are generally 
privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a 
person with access to such information is likely to have access to reliable 
information about that individual’s illegal activities.”
83
 White even 
contrasted these predictions with an easily “predicted” fact that anyone 
could have offered the police—that the officers could find “a car precisely 
matching the caller’s description in front of [White’s] building.”
84
 While it 
could be said that such a tip predicted the future—when police later check 
in front of the building they could see the car parked there—it was a 
prediction anyone driving by could hazard about any car parked at a 
residence, and therefore lacked the insider’s knowledge of future 
behavior.
85
 Thus, when White expanded the basis for a stop and frisk to 
include information from anonymous tips,
86
 it took care to note that the tip 
alone would rarely suffice and that the most reliable informants could 
foresee the future behavior of their subjects.
87
 
                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 326, 331. 
 78. Id. at 330. 
 79. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1990). 
 80. Id. at 332 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245). 
 81. Id. at 332. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 328. 
 87. Id. at 329. 
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The Court’s next anonymous tip case, Florida v. J.L.,
88
 failed to meet 
White’s standards for reasonable suspicion.
89
 In J.L., an anonymous caller 
told Miami-Dade police that, “a young black male standing at a particular 
bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”
90
 Police arrived six 
minutes later to find three black males, one of which was wearing a plaid 
shirt, “just hanging out.”
91
 Officers approached and searched J.L., who was 
wearing the plaid shirt, and found a gun in his pocket.
92
 Summing up these 
facts, the Court stated the issue simply as “whether an anonymous tip that a 
person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police 
officer’s stop and frisk of that person.”
93
 
J.L. concluded that its anonymous tip lacked the necessary indicia of 
reliability, for beyond the caller’s bald assertions, “no predictive 
information” was offered to enable police to test the informant’s knowledge 
or credibility.
94
 While the tipster did accurately describe “the suspect’s 
visible attributes” and his “particular location,” such predictions about a 
person’s dress at a specified place did not provide “any basis for believing 
he had inside information about J.L.”
95
 Instead, anyone driving by the bus 
stop—a “readily observable location”—where J.L. was “hanging out” could 
have informed police about his appearance, clothing, and location.
96
 The tip 
was only credible in its identification of a particular person, not in 
establishing the “likelihood of criminal activity, which is central in 
anonymous-tip cases.”
97
 Thus, the Court’s last word on anonymous tips 
before Navarette explicitly forbad reliance on bare assertions of criminal 
activity from anonymous tipsters who could offer nothing beyond a 
description of a person’s appearance and place. 
                                                                                                     
 88. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 89. Id. at 274. 
 90. Id. at 268. 
 91. Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993)).  
 92. Id. at 268. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 271 (2000). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.at 268, 271–72. 
 97. Id. at 272 (citing 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h), at 213 (3d 
ed.1996)). 
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III.  Navarette v. California 
A. The Facts 
On August 23, 2008, Matia Moore and Sharon Odbert, a Mendocino 
County 911 California Highway Patrol (CHP) dispatch team, received a call 
from their Humboldt County counterpart that “she had received a 911 call 
from a citizen who reported being run off the road by a reckless driver.”
98
 
The Humboldt dispatcher’s report showed up on Sharon Odbert’s computer 
as follows: “Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88, Silver 
Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David-94925. Ran the reporting party off the 
roadway and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.”
99
 When the 
Mendocino County dispatchers broadcast this information at 3:47 p.m., two 
CHP officers, Officer Williams and Sergeant Francis, separately responded 
to the call by heading northbound to the location.
100
 At 4:00 p.m., Sergeant 
Francis “advised dispatch that he had passed the truck, which was going in 
the opposite direction, just south of mile marker 69, approximately 19 miles 
south of the last sighting.”
101
 Five minutes later, after having made a U-
turn, Sergeant Francis pulled the truck, driven by Lorenzo Navarette, 
over.
102
 After hearing that Sergeant Francis had seen the vehicle, Officer 
Williams saw his fellow officer following the truck at mile marker 66.
103
 
Officer Williams made his own U-turn and eventually pulled up behind 
Sergeant Francis.
104
 “There was no evidence that either officer had seen any 
erratic driving while following the truck.”
105
 As the officers approached the 
truck,
106
 they smelled marijuana, leading them to search the vehicle and 
                                                                                                     
 98. Brief for Respondent at 1, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-
9490) [hereinafter Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent].  
 99. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686–87 (2014); see also Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490), at 3 [hereinafter Petition].  
 100. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 4. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687. 
 103. Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 4. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner at 5. 
 106. Id. (noting that the vehicle had a “camper shell with darkened windows” through 
which officers could not see). 
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recover 30 pounds of marijuana.
107
 Police arrested Navarette and his 
passenger, Jose Prado Navarette.
108
  
B.  The Court’s Opinion 
The issue presented in Navarette was whether a report from an 
anonymous 911 caller stating that a truck ran her off the roadway was 
sufficient, under the totality of the circumstances, to establish the 
reasonable suspicion needed for a stop.
109
 The Court, in an opinion written 
by Justice Thomas, recognized that such stops required an officer to possess 
“a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity.
110
 
Navarette, however, emphasized that the level of suspicion needed was 
“‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the 
evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.”
111
    
Navarette candidly acknowledged that an anonymous tip “alone 
seldom” provides a sound basis for reasonable suspicion because such a 
tipster is “by hypothesis largely unknown and unknowable.”
112
 The Court, 
however, noted that White accepted an anonymous tip when its officers 
confirmed some of the informant’s “innocent details” because “an 
informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to 
tell the truth about other things.”
113
 Navarette further declared that J.L.’s 
anonymous “bare-bones tip” failed to establish reasonable suspicion 
because the “tipster did not explain how he knew about the gun, nor did he 
suggest that he had any special familiarity with the young man’s affairs.”
114
 
Moreover, J.L.’s tip “included no predictions of future behavior” that police 
could corroborate to test the informant’s credibility.
115
  
When it turned to the facts in Navarette, the Court concluded, “the call 
bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s 
                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 4 (noting that the marijuana was found in “four large, closed bags” in the bed 
of the truck, along with clippers and fertilizer). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014) (noting that the criminal 
activity suspected was “that the driver was intoxicated”).  
 110. Id. at 1685 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981). 
 111. Id. at 1687 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 112. Id. at 1688 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (emphasis 
added)). 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. 
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account.”
116
 Navarette’s anonymous caller reported that “she had been run 
off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 
8D94925,” and therefore claimed “eyewitness knowledge of the alleged 
dangerous driving.”
117
 The Court determined that the naming of a particular 
vehicle at a certain location committing a specific act provided the “basis of 
knowledge” supporting the tip’s reliability.
118
 The anonymous caller’s 
veracity was bolstered by the officers’ observation of the truck at mile 
marker 69, which fell within a timeline that coincided with the tipster’s 
report.
119
 Not only did the location of the vehicle fit within the caller’s 
narrative, it also suggested “the caller reported the incident soon after she 
was run off the road.”
120
 The Court believed the closeness in time between 
the claimed traffic incident and the 911 call made the tip akin to the hearsay 
exceptions “present sense impression” and “excited utterance,” and thus 
“especially reliable.”
121
 Navarette also determined that use of the 911 
system itself indicated the caller’s veracity, because the emergency system 
possessed “some safeguards” against making false reports, such as the 
chance that a call might be recorded, the passage of laws criminalizing false 
reports, and the creation of regulations requiring identification of a “caller’s 
geographic location with increasing specificity.”
122
 These features, even if 
partial, could cause a reasonable officer to “conclude that a false tipster 
would think twice before using the system.”
123
 Cobbling together all of 
these facts, Navarette concluded, “the indicia of reliability in this case 
[was] sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the 
driver of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road.”
124
 
Forming reasonable suspicion of “an isolated episode of past 
recklessness,” however, did not satisfy the Navarette Court, for it deemed 
an investigative stop required reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity 
may be afoot.”
125
 The 911 caller fulfilled this requirement by alleging 
behavior that indicated an “ongoing crime” of “drunk driving.”
126
 Common 
                                                                                                     
 116. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014). 
 117. Id. at 1689. 
 118. Id. at 1686. 
 119. Id. at 1687. 
 120. Id. at 1689. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689–90 (2014). 
 123. Id. at 1690. 
 124. Id. at 1692 
 125. Id. at 1690 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).  
 126. Id. at 1693. 
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sense dictated that “certain driving behaviors,” such as crossing the center 
line or weaving back and forth “are strongly correlated with drunk 
driving.”
127
 The even more extreme driving of “running another car off the 
highway . . . . bears too great a resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations 
of drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness.”
128
 
Interestingly, “the absence of additional suspicious conduct, after the 
vehicle was first spotted by an officer” did not dispel reasonable suspicion 
of drunk driving, because the driver’s awareness of the officer’s presence 
“would inspire more careful driving for a time.”
129
 Therefore, the 
anonymous tip was reliable and the accusation involved an ongoing 
offense.
130
 This reasoning thus ultimately led Navarette to decide that, even 




IV.  Concerns Created by Navarette’s Reinterpretation of Reasonable 
Suspicion 
A.  Navarette Bootstrapped Reasonable Suspicion out of Nothing More than 
the Informant’s Assertions, Undermining the Fourth Amendment Mandate 
that Officers Establish Individualized Suspicion for Fourth Amendment 
Stops of a Person 
In assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed to stop a truck for 
drunk driving, Navarette offered arguments that amounted to little more 
than bootstrapping. The Court ultimately found its anonymous informant to 
be credible and reliable essentially because the tipster claimed to be so. 
Navarette determined that the informant’s role as an “eyewitness” lent 
“significant support to the tip’s reliability.”
132
 The source advising the 
Court that the informant was an “eyewitness,” however, was the tipster 
herself.
133
 Navarette relied on Illinois v. Gates to note that an informant’s 
“explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a 
                                                                                                     
 127. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–91 (2014). 
 128. Id. at 1691. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1692 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)). 
 132. Id. at 1689. 
 133. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting “the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge”). 
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statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles [the] tip to greater 
weight.”
134
 Yet, here, the event reported—being “run off the road”
 135
—was 
one that was so brief that it offered few details that could be independently 
verified by police, and so remained untested. This contrasted sharply with 
the details that could be tested in Gates, which involved a multistate 
marijuana operation that unfolded over at least a few days. Navarette also 
relied on Spinelli v. United States’ language favoring an informant’s 
personal observations, even though Spinelli involved an established 
bookmaking operation, rather than an event that occurred within seconds.
136
 
While both Gates and Spinelli involved probable cause rather than 
reasonable suspicion, the fact remains that the only testable details 
Navarette’s tipster could offer involved identification of the vehicle, which 
was “generally available knowledge” to “everyone in the world who saw 
the car.”
137
 The Court also believed that “a driver’s claim that another 
vehicle ran her off the road . . . necessarily implies that the informant 
knows the other car was driven dangerously.”
138
 The personal knowledge 
Navarette clings to is once again on the shakiest of foundations—an 
untestable assertion by an anonymous tipster. Navarette declared that the 
informant gave information consistent with the truck’s location when found 
by police, giving “reason to think” she was “telling the truth.”
139
 Many 
fellow motorists could have offered this same information, doing nothing 
more impressive than reporting that the truck “would be heading south on 
Highway 1.”
140
 Navarette’s circular reasoning cannot bear close scrutiny. 
The Court determined that the informant could be trusted as reliable 
because she told police she had personal knowledge of details because she 
was an eyewitness; the truth about her claims of being an eyewitness with 
personal knowledge could be believed because the Court assumed these 
claims to be credible. 
Even if the informant saw “a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 
8D94925” driving at a particular location on the highway, this information 
did not have the weight Navarette gave it in assessing reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 1689 (majority opinion) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 
(1983)). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969). 
 137. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 1689 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1693 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). 
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suspicion.
141
 The 911 caller’s tip lacked the predictions that gave the 
anonymous informant in White credibility.
142
 The White Court distinguished 
between two kinds of predictions.
143
 The first kind of prediction merely 
related to “easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the 
tip,” such as the prediction that officers would find “a car precisely 
matching the caller’s description in front of the 235 building.”
144
 This first 
kind of prediction did not impress White because “[a]nyone could have 
‘predicted’ that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at the 
time of the call.”
145
 In contrast, the second kind of prediction which foretold 
“future actions of third parties” impressed White because the ability to 
predict a suspect’s future behavior “demonstrated inside information” and a 
“special familiarity” with the suspect’s affairs to which the general public 
would have no access.
146
 Navarette’s emphasis on its informant’s ability to 
identify a specific car, down to its license plate, and its location, at a 
particular mile marker
147
 contrasts jarringly with White’s demotion of such 
predictions to something “anyone” could know.
148
 Navarette’s misplaced 
confidence in the informant’s predictive abilities demonstrates the Court’s 
inability to currently distinguish between White’s two kinds of predictions.  
Navarette accepted at face value the assertions of a tipster—a person 
about whom the only things it knew for certain were her gender and her 
ability to operate a car and a phone—that she had personal knowledge as an 
eyewitness of a commission of a crime. The Court then strained to use these 
untested and untestable accusations to label an anonymous informant as 
credible. In doing so, Navarette accepted a new kind of predictive tip as 
establishing credibility, a prediction based on easily obtained facts 
generally available to the public, including those motorists driving with the 
tipster on Highway 1. Such a lenient look at an anonymous informant’s 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 1689 (majority opinion). 
 142. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that “the independent 
corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informant’s predictions imparted 
some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that  “the Court makes a big deal of the fact that the tipster was dead right about the 
fact that a silver Ford F-150 truck (license plate 8D94925) was travelling south on Highway 
1 somewhere near mile marker 88.”). 
 148. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). 
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contentions undermines the rigor of the Court’s reasonable suspicion 
analysis. 
B.  Navarette’s Credulous Approach to Anonymous Informants Would Have 
Caused the Court to Find Reasonable Suspicion in Florida v. J.L.’s Tip 
In J.L., the United States proposed a stop-and-frisk should be found 
reasonable whenever three criteria were met: “(1) an anonymous tip 
provides a description of a particular person at a particular location illegally 
carrying a concealed firearm, (2) police promptly verify the pertinent 
details of the tip except the existence of the firearm, and (3) there are no 
factors that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip.”
149
 The Court dismissed 
such a test as misunderstanding “the reliability needed for a tip to justify a 
Terry stop.”
150
 In light of Navarette’s reasoning, however, today’s Court 
would be quite open to the three-pronged reliability test the United States 
offered in J.L. In fact, a review of the factual analysis in Navarette compels 
the question of whether J.L. would be decided differently had it been 
brought before the Navarette Court.  
Navarette has largely adopted the three-part test the United States 
presented in J.L. Navarette applied a version of the first part of the rejected 
J.L. test—that the tip provide “a description of a particular person at a 
particular location illegally carrying a concealed firearm,”
151
 when it 
deemed its informant’s reliability bolstered by her identification of  “a 
specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925.”
152
 
While Navarette emphasized the accurate description of a particular 
suspected car,
153
 J.L.’s rejected test focused on the accurate description of a 
suspected person.
154
 Further, the importance Navarette placed in the 
informant’s ability to identify the proper location of the suspected car
155
 
                                                                                                     
 149. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).  The United States argued as amicus 
curiae in the case.  
 150. Id. at 272. 
 151. Id. at 271. 
 152. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
 153. See id. (“By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific 
vehicle . . . the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous 
driving.”). 
 154. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (holding that an accurate description of a subject is 
reliable but does not show that the informant has knowledge of concealed criminal activity). 
 155. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014) (relating the informant’s 
contemporaneous report to the hearsay exception for “excited utterances”). 
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echoes the approval given to an informant’s proper identification of the 
location of a suspected person in the test rejected in J.L. Navarette also 
applied a version of the second part of the rejected J.L. test—that the 
“police promptly verify the pertinent details of the tip except the existence 
of the firearm.”
156
 Again, Navarette was pleased by the officer’s 
verification of the car’s appearance and location while not being troubled 
by the officer’s failure to see any bad driving (here analogous to J.L’s 
officers not being able to confirm concealed weapon possession).
157
 Finally, 
as if applying the third part of the rejected J.L. test—“there are no factors 
that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip,”
158
 Navarette felt compelled to 
offer several reasons for dismissing the officer’s failure to find erratic 
driving. The Court speculated that, “the appearance of a marked police car 
would inspire more careful driving for a time.”
159
 This statement borders on 
the bizarre, as noted by Justice Scalia’s quip that “Whether a drunk driver 
drives drunkenly, the Court seems to think, is up to him.”
160
 Next, in a 
statement that could cast doubt on officer testimony in thousands of driving 
under the influence cases, Navarette, in attempting to discount the driver’s 
failure to betray his intoxication, actually claimed that five minutes of 
observation was “hardly” sufficient to assess driving behavior.
161
 Again, 
Justice Scalia disagreed heartily, declaring, “Five minutes is a long time.”
162
  
In its final attempt to explain away the legal significance of police 
observing only proper driving, Navarette offered the following assertion: 
“an officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil a 
vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious driving.”
163
 
While true in the sense that an officer need not gain further information to 
justify a stop once he or she has obtained reasonable suspicion, Navarette’s 
statement fails to address the problem which occurs when an officer does 
perform further surveillance and these observations undermine the initial 
determination of reasonable suspicion. What if the officer comes across a 
reported vehicle and learns that the driver was a “volunteer fireman” 
driving to a fire, a “physician rushing to the hospital or someone who jerked 
                                                                                                     
 156. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 271 (2000). 
 157. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689, 1691. 
 158. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. 
 159. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691. 
 160. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 1691. 
 162. Id. at 1696. 
 163. Id. at 1691. 
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from one lane to another due to a “bee in the car or a crying baby.”164 What 
if the officer followed the driver and found no erratic driving for 30 
minutes, an hour, three hours? Could police ignore these facts in order to 
maintain their grasp on previously formed reasonable suspicion? The force 
of Navarette’s logic flies in the face of a lesson repeatedly emphasized in 
Terry precedent: officers are expected to continue assessing information 
even after they have obtained reasonable suspicion to believe criminality 
exits.
165
 For police must be able to respond to evolving street encounters.
166
 
Adams defended Terry stops as the “essence of good police work” because, 
“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or 
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, 
may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the 
time.”
167
 The Court again assumed that good police work included an 
officer gathering and assessing additional information after obtaining 
reasonable suspicion in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.
168
 In this case, the 
Court held: 
when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a 
particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he 
may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke 
suspicion . . . . The officer may question the driver and passengers about 
their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain 
suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be 
based on consent or probable cause.
169
 
In neither Adams nor Brignoni-Ponce did the Court suggest that the officer 
could turn a blind eye to exculpatory evidence in order to preserve the 
reasonable suspicion initially formed.  
                                                                                                     
 164. AAA FOUNDATION FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, 2 ROAD RAGE: HOW TO AVOID 
AGGRESSIVE DRIVING, https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/RoadRageBrochure. 
pdf. (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 165. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1972) (recognizing that in Terry, 
the Court found the officer may make a brief stop of a suspicious individual to obtain more 
information).  
 166. See Terry v. Evans, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (describing police conduct as 
“necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the 
beat.”). 
 167. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1972). 
 168. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881–82 (1975) (holding that a 
brief stop by an officer to obtain more information from suspicious individuals was 
reasonable). 
 169. Id. at 881. 
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When J.L. is analyzed by the totality of circumstances approach, in the 
manner now applied in Navarette, the tipster would in all likelihood be 
found reliable. In J.L., the tipster noted that the suspected juvenile was 
“wearing a plaid shirt,”
170
 a fact analogous to the make and model of the car 
that so impressed Navarette.
171
 J.L.’s informant placed the suspect at “a 
particular bus stop”
172
 while Navarette’s could only locate him within 
measurements of mile markers.
173
 J.L.’s anonymous caller gave his tip to 
police officers
174
 likely trained in identifying voices and presumably able to 
arrest those who offered them false information while Navarette’s 911 
caller impressed the Court by operating under similar constraints.
175
 The 
fact that police observed J.L. make “no threatening or otherwise unusual 
movements”
176
 would be meaningless because according to Navarette, “an 
officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil” the 
suspect in order to “personally observe” the criminal activity.
177
 Through 
Navarette’s lens, the facts in J.L., as weak as they were, would receive a 
much more generous viewing. Thus, Navarette’s new application of the 
reasonable suspicion standard could open the way to expansion of police 
power, allowing Terry stops in facts quite similar to those in J.L. 
C.  Navarette’s Erosion of Reasonable Suspicion Based on Anonymous 
Informants Will Encourage Passive and Lazy Policing 
Navarette will have a negative impact on police professionalism. The 
Court has long understood the direct link between its rulings and police 
conduct in the field. In New York v. Belton, which defined the scope of 
search incident to arrest for drivers stopped on the road, the Court took care 
                                                                                                     
 170. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). 
 171. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014). 
 172. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
 173. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. 
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reports with immunity.” Id. at 1689. Navarette therefore declared, “a reasonable officer 
could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system.” Id. at 
1690. 
 176. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
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to consider how to craft a workable rule for officers.
178
 Belton noted, “the 
protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments ‘can only be realized 
if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes 
it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an 
invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’”
179
 
Belton recognized that the Fourth Amendment was “intended to regulate the 
police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms 
that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law 
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.”
180
 Similarly, 
when the Gates Court formulated its probable cause test, it was aware that 
the rule would usually be applied by “nonlawyers in the midst of haste.”
181
 




Rules seemingly aiding police by vesting them with powers can lead to 
laxity and sloppy police work. For example, in the confessions context, the 
Court once ruled that the Fifth Amendment
183
 did not apply to state law 
enforcement.
184
 Some police abused this lack of accountability when 
                                                                                                     
 178. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (“[A] single familiar standard is 
essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they 
confront.”) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979)). 
 179. Id. (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" versus 
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 180. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.). 
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nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.”). 
 182. Id. at 231–32.  Justice Scalia put it even more directly, declaring, “Law 
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California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 183. The Fifth Amendment provides: 
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guaranteed by this clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.” 
Id. at 99. 
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seeking confessions.
185
 Later, the Court lamented, “history amply shows 
that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials 
the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence.”
186
 The 
Court in Escobedo v. Illinois noted: 
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system 
of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" 
will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a 
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured 
through skillful investigation. As Dean Wigmore so wisely said: 
"Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust 
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself 
suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon 
such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of 
the other sources.
187 
Navarette, in lowering the bar for establishing reasonable suspicion 
based on anonymous tips, could encourage officers to increasingly rely on 
such grounds instead of performing the labor-intensive task of 
independently building a case for such a stop. In particular, the ease of 
basing a stop on one tip could cause police to stop pursuing the “patient 
skills” once honed over months-long investigations of the kind that 
occurred in United States v. Cortez.
188
 In Cortez, Border Patrol officers in 
Arizona painstakingly analyzed footprints in the desert over a two-month 
period
189
 to determine that “groups of from 8 to 20 persons had walked 
north from the Mexican border, across 30 miles of desert and mountains, 
over a fairly well-defined path.”
190
 Officers, studying a particular shoeprint 
that “bore a distinctive and repetitive V-shaped or chevron design,” were 
able to deduce that the person wearing the shoe that made this print was 
leading the groups across the border.
191
 Analysis of the tracks of this leader, 
whom the officials named “Chevron,” indicated he travelled at night 
(because the obstacles the groups encountered would have been avoided in 
                                                                                                     
 185. For an example of a particularly egregious case of local law enforcement coercing 
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daylight), around weekends, and when the weather was clear.
192
 Officers 
further studied the patterns of the tracks to determine the location where the 
group would be picked up by a vehicle and the direction the vehicle would 
move when it was meeting the group.
193
 Border patrol agents narrowed the 
time of pick up to a five-hour window and even determined the size of the 
vehicle for which they were looking (a pick up large enough to hold 8 to 20 
people).
194
 Finally, the officers did not pull over the vehicle immediately 
upon spotting it, but waited to ensure that its driving behavior (returning in 
an hour and a half and driving in the opposite direction) conformed to the 
suspected criminal activity.
195
 In the wake of Navarette, agents at the border 
might be tempted to dispense with such drudgery, instead asking the public 
to call in tips, even if anonymous, that could be carried out based on little 
more than a description of a vehicle’s appearance and location.  This logic 
of course can be extended to officers accosting people on the sidewalk and 
highway patrol agents stopping drivers suspected of being under the 
influence. 
The phrases “reasonable suspicion,” “totality of the circumstances,” 
and “objective basis” are powerless abstractions. Such rules are “given 
meaning only through (their) application to the particular circumstances of 
a case.”
196
 Navarette’s chief failing occurred during the crucial task of 
giving content to these rules through actual application. The Court invoked 
all the right words, speaking of “a particularized and objective basis” for 
suspecting criminal activity, noting that reasonable suspicion “is dependent 
upon both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree 
of reliability,” and intoning that “[t]hese principles apply with full force to 
investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips.”
197
 
Navarette, however, drained the authority out of these rules by finding them 
satisfied by a nameless caller who offered little more than an accusation and 
a description of a truck’s appearance and place.  
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V.  Conclusion 
In The Lord of the Flies, William Golding’s novel about young boys 
marooned on an island in the tropics, one boy, Jack, paints his face with 
clay before hunting a wild pig.
198
 The “mask was a thing on its own, behind 
which Jack hid, liberated from shame and self-consciousness.”
199
 The 
freedom provided by altering or hiding his identity contributed to Jack’s 
ability to commit act of violence—killing the pig.
200
 Philip Zimbardo, 
professor emeritus at Stanford University, has recognized the dramatic 
psychological consequences of anonymity, warning, “anything, or any 
situation, that makes people feel anonymous, as though no one knows who 
they are or cares to know, reduces their sense of personal accountability, 
thereby creating the potential for evil action.”
201
 The negative consequences 
of anonymity have endangered our roadways. The National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration has reported that road rage is due in part to 
the “anonymity provided by motor vehicles.”
202
 The Automobile Club’s 
research has discovered that over a period of seven years, road rage 
“resulted in at least 218 murders and another 12,610 injury cases.”
203
 If the 
sense of unaccountability that flows from anonymity can contribute to 
drivers’ decisions to attempt murder, it seems quite possible that, among the 
thousands of motorists who are aggravated by the perceived incompetence 
or rudeness of other drivers, many could choose to call police with invented 
stories of reckless driving or worse. There is a curious irony that the 
Navarette decision now empowers informants acting under the cloak of 
anonymity to combat dangerous driving, a behavior emboldened by 
anonymity’s unaccountability in the first place. 
In diluting reasonable suspicion by empowering the anonymous, 
Navarette exploited a weakness in stop and frisk law present from its 
inception. As previously seen, Terry allowed police to seize persons on a 
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level of certainty less than probable cause, a standard having “roots that are 
deep in our history”
204
 and previously understood to be “the best 
compromise that has been found for accommodating . . . often opposing 
interests.”
205
 When it did so, Terry acted without textual backing from the 
Fourth Amendment, thus creating a rule that was vulnerable to erosion. The 
elaborate framework Terry constructed to limit police powers of stop and 
frisk began to crumble only four years later, when, in Adams, the Court 
allowed an officer to both rely on another person’s observations and to 
search beneath the “outer clothing”
206
 by recovering a gun from a suspect’s 
waistband.
207
  Stop and frisk’s “totality of the circumstances” analysis, as 
explained in White, placed even more emphasis on the actual application 
portion of Terry litigation.
208
 Reasonable suspicion thus “acquired content 
only through application.”
209
 This context made Navarette’s application of 
the reasonable suspicion standard to anonymous informants uniquely 
potent.  
Navarette employed this power to limit Fourth Amendment 
protections still further by enabling police to stop cars on the roadway 
based on nothing more than an unknown stranger’s description of a car, its 
location, and a bald accusation. Justice Scalia, in noting that the Court 
purported to adhere to prior Fourth Amendment cases, warned: “Be not 
deceived.”
210
 In shrugging off concerns about tips from anonymous 
informants, Navarette failed to appreciate its weakening of the right to be 
free of unreasonable seizures, the right, in short, “to be let alone.”
211
 In 
easing police officers’ burdens in establishing reasonable suspicion, the 
Court missed a fundamental point: “the forefathers, after consulting the 
lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way 
of a too permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a 
greater danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from 
punishment.”
212
 The Court, while complacently exalting general Fourth 
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Amendment principles, failed to preserve our rights when it came down to 
dealing with the details.   
